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Before I discuss my 1999 price outlook for grains and oil seeds, I would like to thank Jerry 
Rector, Raymond Bridge, and the World Agricultural Outlook Board for the opportunity to speak 
to you today. My primary audience is usually producers, so many of you may not recognize me. 
Since early 1980, I've been helping farmers throughout the United States develop and implement 
marketing plans for merchandising their products throughout the U.S. Currently as Farm 
Journal's outlook editor, I have sought to help producers understand the marketing issues facing 
them. I am also president of Utterback Marketing Services, Inc., a full-service brokerage office. 
We develop strategies for grain and livestock producers. And as brokers, we actually enact the 
strategies for our clients. We have to deal on a daily basis with the consequences of being wrong! 
 
A wave of anxiety about prices is washing over everyone from the producer to the banker to the 
local implement dealer. We’ve talked with farmers throughout the Midwest the last few months. 
Those attending meetings we spoke at are not a scientifically chosen sample, but we think the 
producers at these meetings--from Lafayette, Indiana, to Grand Island, Nebraska--are 
representative of the overall farm population. Their two most frequent questions were, What can 
I do about old- and new-crop corn and soybeans? and Is the Freedom to Farm Act the farmer’s 
friend or foe? Time only permits me a discussion of the first question, I hope to hear from many 
of you about the latter. 
 
What will old- and new-crop prices do? Well, let's start with corn, and consider the near-term 
and potential future fundamentals. 
 
CORN SUPPLY AND DEMAND  96/97 97/98     1998/99 
        DEC.  JAN.          FEB. 
PLANTED        79.5  80.2    80.8  80.2     80.2 
HARVESTED        73.1  73.7    73.8  72.6     72.6 
YIELD PER HARVESTED ACRE  127.1 127    133.3 134.4   134.4 
BEGINNING STOCKS      426  883    1,308 1,308   1,308 
PRODUCTION        9,293 9,366   9,836 9,761   9,761 
IMPORTS        13  9       10    10      12 
SUPPLY,TOTAL   9,732  10,258 11,15  11,079  11,081 
FOOD          5,302 5,505   5,850 5,700   5,700 EXP UP 50 
FOOD/SEED/INDU.              1,692 1,782   1,880 1,870   1,870  
DOMESTIC USE      6,994 7,287   7,730 7,570   7,570 EXP 7,620 
EXPORT        1,795 1,504   1,700 1,700   1,725  
TOTAL USE        8,789 8,791   9,430 9,270   9,295 EXP 9,345  
ENDING STOCKS      883  1,308   1,724 1,809   1,786 EXP 1,736 
CCC INVENTORY      2  4        4     5      12 
FREE STOCKS       881  1304    1,720 1,804   1,774 EXP 1,724  
OUTSTANDING LOAN      179   310      325   325     325 
AVERAGE PRICE      $2.71 $2.43   $2.00 $1.95   $1.95 
SOURCE: USDA  
The only figure we really would take exception with is the 150-million-bushel reduction in the 
feed-usage estimate between December and January. We think that's mostly based on the 
assumption that livestock herds are not going to be reduced as fast as anticipated. Recent 
government efforts to help hog producers, and the rally above the $40 (live weight) break-even 
level by the deferred hog futures, have encouraged producers to modify or postpone their 
decisions to liquidate. We fear the herd liquidation figure in the April hogs and pigs report will 
fall short of the 6.5% level indicated in the December report and well below the 8 to 10% 
currently being discussed by the trade. That leads us to conclude that the feed-usage drop the 
USDA has anticipated will be limited. We do recognize the competition on the Western plains 
from wheat on feed utilization--which is so good and cheap that many producers in Nebraska tell 
us feedlots are simply not interested in their corn. We would be more comfortable with at least 
50 of the 150-million-bushel feed reduction creeping back, raising feed use to 5.750 billion 
bushels; that would make total usage 9.345 billion bushels, and drop carryover to 1.736 billion. 
Some would say this is nit picking since it will most likely not be enough to change the growing 
negative attitude of the market. We just want to start our 1999 projects with as good a number as 
possible. 
 
Three Possible Acreage Projections For Corn. Let's consider three possible acreage 
projections for corn for direction, that should be resolved by the March 30 report. In one, acreage 
is down 1.5 million from last year’s final planted numbers, due to production problems outside 
the traditional Corn Belt--such as in the South--caused by drought or disease. In the second, that 
drop in the South is partly offset by winter wheat acres moving to corn acres in the Midwest; 
making for a net corn-acreage drop of about 800,000 acres. Then there's a possibility that's more 
bearish yet: The reduction in the South is less than anticipated since cotton prices are under 
pressure, the winter wheat acreage goes heavily into corn because of rotation and low soybean 
prices encourage more corn planting elsewhere. Here's something for the bulls to consider: In the 
end, bullish hopes could be blown up by a limited drop in total acreage plus the addition (not 
loss) of more productive acres in yield, with an end result of a limited drop in production. 
 
As for where we stand, early this year we thought that the acreage drop would be less than the 
trade projected, but recent discussions with Western producers have changed our thinking. We 
now feel there is going to be a push to rotate acreage that has been in continuous corn, and plant 
some beans. We now think the March 30 USDA report will project a drop in corn acreage of 
more than 800,000 acres.  Please note that our hunch is, if December corn futures are trading at 
$2.40 or higher at planting and November soybeans is at $5.20 or lower, the March 30 projected 
acreage number could turn out to be the lowest of the year for corn. In our opinion the incentive 
to plant soybeans will not be as attractive, and growers will likely plant more corn, if weather 
permits. 
 
1999 UMS CORN – WHAT IF? 
      1999 PROJECTIONS 
 ACRES   ACRES   ACRES 
     Dn1.5      Dn.8       Up.6 
PLANTED        78.7    79.4         80.8 
HARVESTED 92% OF PLANTED  72.4    73.0     74.3 
 
 Our working assumption going into this year is that it's going to be more difficult to get a 
yield loss due to weather influence because of where the crop is produced. Without a major dry 
weather event (some are saying it has the potential of over 40%), we feel the potential exists, 
with moisture already rather good, to have yields at trendline plus. 
 
With acreage down just modestly, we believe the only potential price-rally engines should be 
lower yield or stronger demand. The producers are starting to realize this and that is why they are 
getting scared. 
 
We'll start with yield. There are two things to consider first: Good late-fall weather allowed 
producers from Ohio to Nebraska to get a lot of their tillage and pre-planting work done, and 
producers' concerns about late-summer La Nina weather trouble will likely drive them to plant 
both corn and beans EARLY and HARD if they don't have a wet spring. We would also suggest 
a positive impact of the Freedom of Farm has been the implementation of a good 50-50 rotation 
mix of corn and beans. The end result is acreage is more rested and recharged to increase the 
corn production potential.  To get an idea of the range of possibilities, let's consider three 
scenarios. In the first, delayed plantings and significant summer weather trouble cut yield 15% 
reduction from the 134.4 bushels an acre of 1998--along the lines of the 18.1% drop of 1995, not 
near the 1983 reduction of 28.4%, the 1988 reduction of 29.4% or the 1993 reduction of 23.4%. 
Frankly, if seriously projecting a yield drop that great, my best recommendation for the producer 
might be not to plant. Any producer will tell you he would prefer big production and low prices 
to low production and high prices. 
  
The second scenario is of a typical year, with yield reaching the average of the last three 
years'--though we believe the result is slightly low, given the possibility that better-producing 
acres will be substituting for some worse-producing ones this year. 
 
Finally, let's consider a modest yield increase of 2.5% from last year's level; that would still 
leave it short of 1994's record yield of 138.6 bushels an acre, which we all know will be 
exceeded one of these years. 
 
1999 UMS CORN – WHAT IF? 
         1999 PROJECTIONS 
YIELD PER HARVESTED AC.   114.2    129.4   137.8 
BEGINNING STOCKS      1,736    1,736   1,736 
PRODUCTION        8,269    9,452  10,244 
IMPORTS           12       10      10 
SUPPLY,TOTAL             10,015   11,198  11,990                        
 
So our three scenarios suggest corn supply of 10 billion to 12 billion bushels for the 1999 season. 
Let's consider three demand scenarios as well. 
 
1999 UMS CORN – WHAT IF? 
     1999 PROJECTIONS  
FOOD          5,600   5,775   5,850 
FOOD, SEED/INDU.              1,776   1,924   1,964 
DOMESTIC USE              7,376   7,699   7,814 
EXPORT        1,587   1,776   1,863 
TOTAL USE        8,963   9,475   9,650 
 The demand side of the equation is more difficult to predict for 1999. Our opinion is biased since 
we work with the producer rather than the end user; but we suggest the following as starting 
points. On feed consumption, the first, low estimate assumes that higher grain prices and 
continued herd liquidation reduces demand-- down 1.7%, the second that consumption goes up 
1.3% and the third that it goes up 2.6% because hog producers expand. The first industrial usage 
estimate represents a 5% drop, just as we saw in 1995. The second, likelier one is for a gain of 
3%, a conservative increase based on the assumption that lower prices will stimulate usage. The 
third reflects a 5% increase, along the lines of what we saw in 1994, 1996 and 1997. 
 
Exports are the big unknown and where we need the growth to change the bears’ grip on the 
market. Did low 1998 hog prices force liquidation outside the U.S., which could reduce the 
demand for feed grains globally? What effect will a weaker dollar have? Will there be a surprise 
government program to stimulate usage as the 2000 election nears and political pressure mounts? 
Add these background uncertainties to exports' tendency to leap and dive, and you see the 
difficulties. The last three years have all brought double-digit changes: A 19.4% drop from 1995 
to 1996, a 16.2% drop from 1996 to 1997 and a 13% rise from 1997 to 1998. And it's only a few 
years since the 63% jump between 1993 and 1994. To say the average change over the last five 
years has been 8% really doesn't do these gyrations justice. Still, we must make a projection just 
the same: a 3% increase for the mid-range, flanked by an 8% decline and an 8% increase. 
 
The result: Our total usage estimates range from 8.963 billion bushels to 9.650 billion. 
 
1999 UMS CORN – WHAT IF? 
           1999 PROJECTIONS  
ENDING STOCKS      1,052   1,723  2,340 
CCC INVENTORY         12      12     14 
FREE STOCKS       1,040   1,711  2,330 
OUTSTANDING LOAN 
STOCKS TO USE         12%     18%    24% 
U.S. AVERAGE YEARLY PRICE  $2.50   $1.95  $1.50  
 
And there we have an answer to the question about corn prices. 
 
So if acres are dropped at least 1.5 million and we have one of the largest year-to-year drops in 
harvested yield, and demand declines only modestly, we feel the best we can hope for in 1999 is 
that stocks reach a reasonable 1.053 billion bushels, which would set things up nicely for a 
summer bounce in 2000--driven by weather or politics. The mid-range estimates lead to a 
carryover of 1.7 billion bushels, just slightly less than where it is now. Still, we project a yearly 
price about 10 cents lower than in 1998, based on an uncertain international economy and 
bearish pressure from wheat and beans. 
  
Then there is the third possibility: no reduction in planted acres, increased yield and only modest 
demand growth. If these come to be, free stocks could reach their highest level ever, and prices 
could drop to levels not seen since the 1960s. We hope to see the first alternative, and my fear 
the latter. 
 
UMS Assumptions for 1999: 
•  Producers will sell only limited amounts of their unpriced loan deficiency payment inventory 
before March 1. •  Producers will put inventory under loan and try to starve the market this spring. 
•  Elevators will offer free deferred pricing or allow producers to deliver summer forward 
contracts in April and May, which gets the inventory the end user needs met at this time. 
•  USDA's March 30 prospective plantings report will forecast a modest decline in corn 
acreage, but will eventually end up below a one million acre reduction. 
•  Mid-May will be a key period for the market. If the May 10 crop progress report doesn't 
show signs of delayed planting, and the May 12 supply/demand report doesn't show higher 
usage, any spring rally will grind to a halt. 
•  Adequate soil moisture means weather-related crop difficulties, if they come at all, will be 
late like 1983. 
•  The loan deficiency payment will be a critical part of any profit from the 1999 crop. Please 
note that, if USDA is to maintain any credibility with the producers in the new age of the 
farm program, we cannot emphasize strong enough the LDP payment differentials not be 
played with to reduce potential budget exposure and subsequently reduce farmer payments. 
•  It is our belief that producers must be alert to defend against a 1998-style early harvest low 
and fall recovery influence on their LDP payments. 
 
We start with the assumption that producers who made use of the loan deficiency payment 
program last fall did little in the way of pricing. The price was too low to motivate selling, and 
many producers still don't understand the implications of a large-carrying-charge market. The 
result is that a tremendous number of producers are still holding unpriced inventory. Current 
prices represent a loss for them, and my years of working with producers tell me they are not 
going to let go of the inventory. It should be noted that we do not believe farmers will store as 
aggressively in 1999 as they have over the last three years. This belief is based on the assumption 
that, if prices are under pressure, bankers will want loans cleaned up, as well as the significant 
amount of short interest in the grain elevators. 
 
As for the near future, we expect a short-covering rally to develop gradually as March 30 
approaches. In our opinion it will be more in the deferred than the nearby contacts. End users, 
scrambling for inventory, will likely buy the March futures and force delivery, which could also 
help to rally the market. We feel the March 30 report will confirm an acreage reduction, setting 
the stage for a flat-price rally in April and May; the extent of the rally will heavily depend on the 
incidence of planting delays. Producers will likely continue to sit on their crops, leaving the 
market cash-starved. We believe there will be a key stretch of days in mid-May for producers to 
watch. If the May 10 crop condition reports that plantings are at or above the five-year average 
and no significant delay-causing rain is expected, prices of deferred futures will start to soften. In 
our opinion, May 12th will be D-Day for 1999 marketing decisions; if the supply/demand report 
shows no sign that lower prices are creating significantly higher usage, the market will have no 
alternative but to send prices for deferred contracts lower, with the downward momentum 
increasing as crop progress continues. 
 
In our opinion, the critical variables for corn are when producers sell corn, how many acres they 
plant, how livestock production holds up, how much is exported and, the big wild card, whether 
the government tries to stimulate demand or change policy on the use of LDP. 
  
SOYBEAN SUPPLY/DEMAND     1996/97      1997/98     1998/1999 
         JANUARY    FEBRUARY 
AREA 
PLANTED        64.2          70.6  72.4         72.4 
HARVESTED        63.4      69.6  70.8         70.8    
YIELD PER HARVESTED ACRE  37.6          38.8  38.9         38.9 
SOURCE: USDA 
 
In the past many producers counted on soybeans to be the mortgage lifter, and this year they 
want to know if they can count on the price hitting $6.50 again. Well, let's look at the numbers, 
starting with supply. 
 
BEGINNING STOCKS        183     132   200      200 
PRODUCTION        2,380   2,689     2,757    2,757 
IMPORTS            9       5         6            6 
SUPPLY,TOTAL      2,573   2,826     2,963        2,963 
SOURCE: USDA 
 
Essentially, we have no quarrel at all with this side of the February report. The working supply is 
expected to be a relatively modest 4.8% larger than last year's -- but 15% larger than that of two 
years ago. Is demand going to keep up? 
 
CRUSHING     1,436   1,597   1,595   1,595 
EXPORTS              882      870     830         810  
SEED                 83      86      87          87    
RESIDUAL           42          86          61          65   
TOTAL USE        2,443   2,626       2,573       2,553 
 
ENDING STOCKS         131     200         390         410  
AVERAGE FARM PRICE    $7.35   $6.45   $5.35       $5.20   
SOURCE: USDA 
 
In our opinion, no -- clearly, demand has fallen on hard times. Total use was projected at 2.573 
billion bushels in the January report, the February report indicated a reduction in exports (as 
expected), which reduced use to 2,553. In fact, by the time we get to fall, we expect the 
carryover projection may well be higher than the current 410 million bushels. But for the sake of 
our "what if?" analysis, we will use 410. It is over three times the carryover of two years ago, 
and twice that of last year, and will result (USDA estimates) in an average price that's down 29% 
from that of two years ago and 19% from that of one year ago. The nagging question, with 
potential for large carryover, how low will prices have to sink before usage is stimulated and 
acreage is reduced here and abroad? 
 
1999 UMS SOYBEANS – WHAT IF? 
      1999 PROJECTIONS 
           UNCHANGED     UP 1.75 MIL.     UP 2.75 MIL. 
     
PLANTED     72.4         74.2   75.2 
HARVESTED @ 98.35%    71.2       73.0    74.0 
YIELD PER HARVESTED AC.   32.7       38.5    39.5 
 
Whether you want to argue soybean prices higher or lower depends heavily on your assumptions 
about bean acreage. We believe strongly that they're going up; the question is how much? Consider the economics of the corn, wheat, cotton, and bean loans versus cash flow; beans are 
getting the nod by many producers. Finally, consider the pressure from bankers to reduce risk 
this year; beans are a favorite of producers. In our opinion, the conclusion is clear for producers: 
PLANT BEANS. What we’re hearing about seed sales, especially in the western states supports 
this. Indeed, with the reduction in wheat acreage in the western states, we really believe there is a 
risk in being too conservative in forecasting bean acreage. 
 
So we don't even consider the possibility that acreage will decline for 1999; our most bullish 
forecast is based on no change. Our midrange forecast assumes an increase of 1.75 million acres, 
and our most bearish an increase of 2.75 million. 
 
As for the yield, let's assume for the low end a drop of 15% from last year's, to 32.7 bushels an 
acre, the lowest since flood-struck 1993, but far better than the 27 bushels of drought-struck 
1988. That decline is just a bit short of the 16.37% average of the last four bad-weather years: 
The 1983 drop was 16.8%, the 1988 was 20.3%, the 1993 was 13.3% and 1995 was 14.7%. 
Remember that the seed plasma is better and producers are better equipped to get the crop in and 
out quicker. 
 
1999 UMS SOYBEANS – WHAT IF? 
      1999 PROJECTIONS  
           UNCHANGED     UP 1.75 MIL.     UP 2.75 MIL. 
BEGINNING STOCKS        410     410          410 
PRODUCTION        2,340       2,810        2,921 
IMPORTS            8       8            8 
SUPPLY,TOTAL      2,758       3,228    3,339 
 
So the total supply for 1999 is projected to range from 2.76 billion to 3.3 billion bushels. With 
supply growth of this magnitude, pressure should be on the demand side to show major growth. 
 
1999 UMS SOYBEANS – WHAT IF? 
      1999 PROJECTIONS 
           UNCHANGED     UP 1.75 MIL.     UP 2.75 MIL.  
CRUSH      1637         1670       1675 
EXPORTS         850        880           910 
SEED            90         91        91 
RESIDUAL                  59         59            59 
TOTAL USE        2609       2673          2735 
ENDING STOCKS       144            555       604 
AVERAGE FARM PRICE       $6.75         $4.48     $4.20 
 
Again the demand side of the equation is where we feel the weakest is in our projections, but 
we’re going to assume the best possible. The crush estimates suggest strong demand for oil, so 
our worst case scenario is that crush will be unchanged. Our mid-range is for a 3% rise, and the 
best case is an 8% rise to 1675 million bushels. History suggests we must assume a generous 
jump in export levels; but we’re having trouble increasing substantially because of our concern 
about the currency devaluation wave, which washed over much of Asia in 1997 and hit Brazil 
just recently. In our opinion China is the big wild card in the export situation. Do they devalue 
their currency or put up trade barriers to protect their export market share? Again, government 
policy--both domestically and internationally--will become the wild card that will act to change 
today's estimates in the future for better or worse. We’re wondering if policy makers can stay 
out and allow prices to go into a steep decline in order to stimulate use and reduce production, or will political pressure increase to such a point that it will force a policy 
aimed at softening the negative impact of lower prices before next year's presidential 
election?  
 
OUR ASSUMPTIONS FOR 1999 REGARDING SOYBEANS: 
•  Acreage will grow by at least 1.75 million acres, maybe more. 
•  Demand will respond to lower prices, but not fast enough to match the increase in 
production. 
•  Result: Carryover could potentially grow to a level not seen since 1985 and maybe to record 
highs. 
•  In our opinion only major government demand stimulation can prevent prices from moving 
well below the variable cost of production. We expect the average yearly U.S. price to be 
below $5 for the first time since 1975. 
 
So the working assumptions behind our 1999 marketing plan have been that production will rise 
faster than demand, allowing carryover to grow to historically high levels. We believe producers 
are still hopeful that significant policy changes will occur to save the 1998 season, but we 
ourselves are not -- we don't see the government acting, if at all, until after the 1999 crop is 
confirmed. 
 
Given a potential 47% increase in carryover, how much of a price decline will it take to stimulate 
usage and discourage production? Unfortunately, we think it will require at least 14% -- which 
would mean a yearly average price of $4.48 -- and that there's a real risk it will take 19%, which 
would mean a yearly average price of $4.20! That would explode the government's LDP price 
payments. 
 
Please note that many producers are wondering whether the USDA would play with the LDP 
differentials to keep government exposure cost down. It seems they are just now becoming aware 







•  A modest reduction in corn acres and a major increase in soybean acres. 




•  The degree of price risk depends on whether government policy allows a free fall in prices to 
develop, causing inventory to move and acres to be reduced. 
•  There are still opportunities for producers to grab a profitable price for their corn, but the 
soybean market is unlikely to offer anything better than MARKETING LOAN LESS 
STORAGE COST PLUS OR MINUS BASIS GAIN.  
•  The loan deficiency payment will be critical to producer survival. 
 We hope: 
•  The LDP program will not be influenced to reduce budget exposure. 
•  Help producers get a bigger piece of the income pie. 
•  Help to improve farmers’ understanding of marketing risk exposure and developing better 
marketing plans to handle the increased market volatility. 
•  A review of policy to give some incentive to reduce acres when carryover exceeds 1.5 billion 
in corn and 350 in beans and 600 in wheat in the 2000 production year. 
 
It has been my pleasure to speak with you about our outlook and our concerns for the 1999 corn 
and soybean marketing season. We hope that producers will use a spring price bounce to reduce 
downside price risk; but we’re afraid that they will not move fast enough. The clock is ticking, 
and we may be on the edge of a financially taxing period for the American farmer. 
 
Hypothetical performance results have many inherent limitations. Some of which are described below. No representation is being 
made that any account will or is likely to achieve profits or losses similar to those shown. In fact, there are frequently sharp 
differences between hypothetical performance results and the actual results subsequently achieved by any particular trading 
program. One of the limitations of hypothetical performance results is that they are generally prepared with the benefit of hindsight. 
In addition, hypothetical trading does not involve financial risk, and no hypothetical trading record can completely account for the 
impact of financial risk in actual trading. For example, the ability to withstand losses or to adhere to a particular trading program in 
spite of trading losses are material points which can also adversely affect actual trading results. There are numerous other factors 
related to the markets in general or to the implementation of any specific trading program which cannot be fully accounted for in the 
preparation of hypothetical performance results and all of which can adversely affect actual trading results. Before trading, one 
should be aware that with potential profits there is also potential for losses, which may be very large. You should read the “Futures 
and Options Risk Disclosure Statement(s)” and should understand the risks before trading. Commodity trading may note be suitable 
for recipients of this presentation. Those acting on this information are responsible for their own actions. Although every reasonable 
attempt has been made to ensure the accuracy of the information provided, Utterback Marketing Services, and its agents assume 
no responsibility for any errors or omissions. Any republication or other use of this information and those expressed herein without 
the written permission of Utterback Marketing Services, Inc. is strictly prohibited. Copyright Utterback Marketing Services, Inc. 1999. 
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